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OPINION AND ORDER 
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:  
  
The advent of new technologies in the field of biometrics  
--- the field of science relating to the identification of 
humans based upon unique biological traits, such as 
fingerprints, DNA, and retinas --- has produced new ways of 
conducting commercial transactions. In 2008, to promote, 
regulate, and safeguard the use of biometrics in financial 
transactions, Illinois enacted the Illinois Biometric 
Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1 et seq. (the 
“BIPA”), which sets forth disclosure, consent, and retention 
requirements for private entities that collect, store, and 
disseminate biometric data.  
The defendant, Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. (“Take-
Two”), is one such private entity that collects biometric data 
for use in its video games, “NBA 2K15” and “NBA 2K16.” The 
plaintiffs, Vanessa Vigil and Ricardo Vigil, have brought this 
putative class action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). More specifically, Ricardo Vigil bought and 
played NBA 2K15, and his sister Vanessa Vigil played his copy of 
that video game. The plaintiffs used a feature in the video game 
to scan their respective faces to create personalized virtual 
basketball players, exclusively for in-game play. Although the 
plaintiffs do not contend that their face scans have been 
disseminated, or used for any purpose, other than for playing 
the video game, for which they gave consent, the plaintiffs 
contend that Take-Two failed to comply with various provisions 
of the BIPA. 
On January 15, 2016, Take-Two moved pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1), and Rule 12(b)(6), of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court issued Spokeo, Inc. v. Robin, 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016), which clarified that for an injury-in-fact to be 
“concrete,” it must be “real, and not abstract,” and that a 
“bare procedural violation” under a federal statute, “divorced 
from any concrete harm,” that “may result in no harm,” would not 
“satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.” Id. at 1549 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). By Order dated July 1, 2016, this 
Court ruled that the plaintiffs should be allowed to replead in 
light of Spokeo, and denied without prejudice to renewal Take-
Two’s pending motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 42. The plaintiffs 
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filed their Second Amended Complaint, and Take-Two renewed its 
motion. 
The parties subsequently submitted supplemental letters 
concerning the impact of Strubel v. Comenity Bank, No. 15-528-
CV, 2016 WL 6892197 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 2016), which interpreted 
Spokeo.  
For the following reasons, Take-Two’s motion to dismiss the 
Second Amended Complaint is granted.1 
I. 
When presented with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and a motion to dismiss on other grounds, the 
first issue is whether the Court has the subject matter 
jurisdiction necessary to consider the merits of the action. See 
Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 896 F.2d 674, 
678 (2d Cir. 1990).  
In defending against a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of proving the Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 
                                                 
1 Take-Two has moved in the alternative to strike the Second 
Amended Complaint’s class allegations. Because the Second 
Amended Complaint is dismissed for want of standing, and for 
failure to establish a cause of action under the BIPA, it is 
unnecessary to reach the alternative basis for relief. Take-
Two’s motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint’s class 
allegations is therefore denied as moot. 
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evidence. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 
2000). In considering such a motion, the Court generally must 
accept the material factual allegations in the complaint as 
true. See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 
110 (2d Cir. 2004). The Court does not, however, draw all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.; see also 
Graubart v. Jazz Images-, Inc., No. 02-CV-4645 (KMK), 2006 WL 
1140724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). Indeed, where 
jurisdictional facts are disputed, the Court has the power and 
the obligation to consider matters outside the pleadings, such 
as affidavits, documents, and testimony, to determine whether 
jurisdiction exists. See Anglo–Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. 
P.T. Jamsostek, 600 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2010); APWU v. 
Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003); Kamen v. Am. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986). In so doing, the 
Court is guided by the body of decisional law that has developed 
under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Kamen, 
791 F.2d at 1011; see also Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs 
Enf’t Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 811 F. Supp. 2d 
803, 821-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all 
reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. 
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 
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2007). The Court’s function on a motion to dismiss is “not to 
weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely 
to determine whether the complaint itself is legally 
sufficient.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 
1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the 
plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a 
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in 
the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. 
When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced 
in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in 
bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff’s possession 
or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of 
which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner, 
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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II. 
Illinois enacted the BIPA in 2008. The legislative findings 
accompanying the BIPA explain that the BIPA was passed, in part, 
because the Illinois legislature anticipated that commercial 
businesses would increasingly use biometric data, such as 
fingerprints, to facilitate financial transactions. 740 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 14/5(a-b). As the Illinois legislature observed, 
biometric data are by definition unique, and thus --- unlike a 
credit card number --- cannot realistically be changed if they 
are subject to identity theft. See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5(c). 
The Illinois legislature was concerned that the failure of 
businesses to implement reasonable safeguards for such data 
would deter Illinois citizens from “partaking in biometric 
identifier-facilitated transactions” in the first place, and 
would thus discourage the proliferation of such transactions as 
a form of engaging in commerce. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5(e). 
The BIPA represents the Illinois legislature’s judgment that the 
collection and storage of biometrics to facilitate financial 
transactions is not in-of-itself undesirable or impermissible; 
instead, the purpose of the BIPA is to ensure that, when an 
individual engages in a biometric-facilitated transaction, the 
private entity protects the individual’s biometric data, and 
does not use that data for an improper purpose, especially a 
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purpose not contemplated by the underlying transaction. See 740 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5(a-g). 
Under the BIPA, a “biometric identifier” is “a retina or 
iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face 
geometry,” while “biometric information” is information based on 
“biometric identifiers.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/10. Among other 
things, the BIPA includes a number of provisions to regulate the 
collection, dissemination, and storage of biometric identifiers 
and biometric information. First, Section 15(a) provides that: 
A private entity in possession of biometric 
identifiers or biometric information must develop a 
written policy, made available to the public, 
establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for 
permanently destroying biometric identifiers and 
biometric information when the initial purpose for 
collecting or obtaining such identifiers or 
information has been satisfied or within 3 years of 
the individual’s last interaction with the private 
entity, whichever occurs first. 
 
See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(a). Second, the BIPA 
requires private entities to “store, transmit, and protect from 
disclosure all biometric identifiers and biometric information 
using the reasonable standard of care within the private 
entity’s industry,” and to treat such identifiers and 
information as sensitive and confidential. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
14/15(e). 
Third, Section 15(b) provides that a private entity that 
collects biometric identifiers or biometric information must (1) 
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inform the subject in writing that a biometric identifier, or 
biometric information, is being collected; (2) inform the 
subject in writing of the purpose and length of the collection 
and storage; and (3) receive a written release from the subject. 
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(b). Fourth, Section 15(c) prohibits 
private entities from selling biometric identifiers and 
biometric information to third-parties. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
14/15(c). Finally, and relatedly, Section 15(d) prohibits 
private entities from disseminating biometric identifiers and 
biometric information without prior written consent, or unless 
such dissemination is necessary to complete a financial 
transaction authorized by the subject. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
14/15(d).  
The BIPA provides that “any person aggrieved by a 
violation” of the BIPA may pursue money damages and injunctive 
relief against the offending party.2 See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
14/20. The BIPA also provides for attorney’s fees to be awarded 
to the prevailing party. See id. 
                                                 
2 Specifically, the BIPA provides that the prevailing party may 
recover the greater of $1,000 in liquidated damages, or actual 
damages, for each negligent violation of the BIPA, and the 
greater of $5,000 in liquidated damages, or actual damages, for 
each reckless or intentional violation of the BIPA. See 740 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 14/20. 
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III. 
A. 
Take-Two is a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters 
and principal place of business located in New York, New York, 
that publishes, develops, and distributes video games. SAC ¶¶ 1, 
9. Among numerous other video games, Take-Two publishes, 
develops, and distributes the popular video games “NBA 2K15” and 
“NBA 2K16” (collectively, the “NBA 2K Games”) that are playable 
on personal computers and other gaming platforms. SAC ¶ 1. The 
NBA 2K Games are basketball simulation video games that allow a 
gamer to play as, and against, virtual basketball players, many 
of whom are designed based upon real professional players from 
the National Basketball Association. SAC ¶ 27. A gamer can play 
the NBA 2K Games in multiplayer mode with other gamers over the 
Internet. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 36. 
The NBA 2K Games include the “MyPlayer” feature, which 
allows a gamer to create a “personalized basketball avatar” 
based upon a three-dimensional rendition of the gamer’s face. 
SAC ¶¶ 27, 29. To create the avatar, the NBA 2K Games use 
cameras connected to the gaming platform to scan the gamer’s 
face and head. SAC ¶ 29. The scanning is a lengthy and involved 
process that takes about 15 minutes, during which time the gamer 
must stare up-close at the camera while also turning his or her 
head from side-to-side at regular intervals. SAC ¶ 29.  
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The plaintiffs allege that Take-Two’s proprietary 
technology extracts geometric data from the scan related to the 
unique points and contours of the gamer’s face, and converts 
that data into a personally identifying animated rendition of 
the gamer’s face. SAC ¶¶ 29-31. The rendition then becomes the 
face of the gamer’s personalized basketball avatar for in-game 
play. SAC ¶ 29. The MyPlayer feature’s only alleged purpose is 
to create personalized basketball avatars. See SAC ¶ 27. 
If a gamer wishes to use the MyPlayer feature, the gamer 
must first agree to the following terms and conditions: 
Your face scan will be visible to you and others you 
play with and may be recorded or screen captured 
during gameplay. By proceeding you agree and consent 
to such uses and other uses pursuant to the End User 
License Agreement. 
www.take2games.com/eula 
 
See SAC ¶ 28.3 Third-party gamers can view the rendition if 
the gamer choses to play with the personalized basketball avatar 
in multiplayer mode. See SAC ¶ 35. There is no requirement that 
a gamer who uses the MyPlayer feature be an actual purchaser or 
owner of an NBA 2K Game. See SAC ¶ 40.  
The plaintiffs allege that Take-Two indefinitely stores the 
biometric information it collects through the face scans on its 
servers. SAC ¶ 28. They also allege that Take-Two transmits 
unencrypted biometric information through the “open commercial 
                                                 
3 The hyperlink in the terms and conditions links to Take-Two’s 
“Limited Software Warranty and License Agreement.” 
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Internet.” SAC ¶ 35. The plaintiffs further allege that Take-Two 
markets and advertises the MyPlayer feature. SAC ¶ 36. 
B. 
The plaintiffs, Ricardo Vigil and Vanessa Vigil, are 
siblings, and are alleged to be residents and citizens of 
Illinois. SAC ¶¶ 7-8, 39-40. The Second Amended Complaint 
alleges that Ricardo Vigil is the purchaser and owner of a copy 
of NBA 2K15, and that Vanessa Vigil played her brother’s copy of 
the game. SAC ¶¶ 39-40. 
The plaintiffs allege that they each used the MyPlayer 
feature to scan their faces to create their own personalized 
basketball avatars. SAC ¶ 41. Prior to the scanning, the 
plaintiffs allege that they each agreed to the MyPlayer terms 
and conditions described above. SAC ¶ 41. The plaintiffs allege 
that they subsequently chose to enter a multiplayer game with 
their personalized basketball avatars, meaning that the digital 
renditions of their faces, which the plaintiffs claim constitute 
biometric information under the BIPA, were visible to third-
parties also playing NBA 2K15. SAC ¶ 45. The Second Amended 
Complaint contains no allegations regarding the quality of the 
plaintiffs’ personalized basketball avatars, such as the degree 
to which the digitized faces of the plaintiffs’ avatars 
resembled the plaintiffs. 
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Even though the plaintiffs agreed to the MyPlayer terms and 
conditions, the plaintiffs allege that they failed to appreciate 
the gravity associated with using MyPlayer --- especially that 
renditions of their face scans would be allegedly indefinitely 
stored on Take-Two’s servers, transmitted over the commercial 
Internet, and subject to allegedly inadequate protections --- 
because they did not receive adequate written disclosures from 
Take-Two. See SAC ¶¶ 42-52. The plaintiffs allege that they have 
both “become weary” of participating in biometric-facilitated 
transactions, and have since refrained from participating in 
such transactions due to their experience with NBA 2K15. SAC ¶ 
61. 
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Ricardo Vigil’s 
purchase of NBA 2K15 was motivated in material part by his 
desire to use the MyPlayer feature, but that he did not at the 
time of the purchase understand Take-Two’s alleged practices 
with respect to biometric information. SAC ¶¶ 53-55. The Second 
Amended Complaint alleges that, “After purchasing and opening 
the packaging on the NBA 2K15 video game, Plaintiff Ricardo 
Vigil had no option to return the video game for a monetary 
refund,” and that he has therefore suffered tangible, monetary 
harm. SAC ¶ 55.  
There is no allegation that the plaintiffs did not realize 
that their own faces were unique identifiers prior to using the 
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MyPlayer feature. There is no allegation that the plaintiffs did 
not understand that the only purpose of the MyPlayer feature was 
to create a personalized basketball avatar for in-game play, 
including in multiplayer mode. And there is no allegation that 
the plaintiffs’ face scans have been disseminated in any form 
other than to the gamers who played in multiplayer games with 
the plaintiffs.4  
The plaintiffs claim that Take-Two has violated the BIPA in 
almost every respect. First, the plaintiffs claim that Take-Two 
did not publicly provide a retention schedule or guidelines for 
permanently destroying biometric identifiers in violation of 
Section 15(a). SAC ¶¶ 38, 75. Second, they claim that Take-Two 
failed to inform the plaintiffs properly in writing that their 
biometric identifiers would be collected, and failed to explain 
the purpose and length of that collection, in violation of 
Section 15(b). SAC ¶¶ 32-33, 73. Third, the plaintiffs claim 
that Take-Two collected biometric information without first 
obtaining a written release from the plaintiffs, also in 
violation of Section 15(b). SAC ¶¶ 34, 74. Fourth, the 
plaintiffs claim that Take-Two disclosed and disseminated their 
biometric identifiers without obtaining adequate consent in 
                                                 
4 Counsel for the plaintiffs made clear at oral argument that the 
plaintiffs are not seeking to base their claims on their 
volitional entrance into multiplayer games, where the digital 
renditions of their faces on the personalized basketball avatars 
could be viewed by third-parties. 
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violation of Section 15(d). SAC ¶¶ 35, 76. Fifth, the plaintiffs 
claim that Take-Two failed to transmit their biometric 
identifiers with industry-standard reasonable care in violation 
of Section 15(e). SAC ¶¶ 35, 37, 77. Finally, the plaintiffs 
claim that Take-Two has profited from the plaintiffs’ biometric 
identifiers in violation of Section 15(c). SAC ¶¶ 36, 57, 78. 
The plaintiffs seek money damages, injunctive relief, and 
reasonable attorney’s fees. SAC ¶¶ 79-80. 
IV. 
The plaintiffs have compiled a long list of purported 
technical violations of the BIPA. In an effort to create 
standing to pursue their claims for these technical violations, 
the plaintiffs try several different alleged theories of harm, 
variously arguing that they have suffered from the procedural 
violations themselves (including from “informational injuries” 
and the enhanced risk of harm that their face scans will be 
subject to a data breach); apprehension about engaging in future 
biometric-facilitated transactions; misappropriation; intrusion 
on seclusion; and a diminished benefit-of-the-bargain associated 
with purchasing NBA 2K15.  
Take-Two has moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint 
for two reasons. First, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Take-Two argues that the plaintiffs do 
not have Article III standing to pursue their claims under the 
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Constitution. Second, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Take-Two argues that the plaintiffs do 
not have a cause of action under the BIPA.5  
A. 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). To 
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, a plaintiff 
must show that (1) the plaintiff has suffered an actual or 
imminent injury in fact, which is concrete and particularized; 
(2) there is a causal connection between the injury and 
defendant’s actions; and (3) it is likely that a favorable 
decision in the case will redress the injury. Id. at 560–61. 
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 
establishing these elements.” Id. at 561; see also Springer v. 
                                                 
5 Take-Two semantically framed its second argument for dismissal 
as being based on “statutory standing” grounds, but the “Supreme 
Court has recently clarified . . . that what has been called 
‘statutory standing’ in fact is not a standing issue, but simply 
a question of whether the particular plaintiff ‘has a cause of 
action under the statute.’” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem 
Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014)). The Court of Appeals has advised that 
courts should “avoid [the statutory standing] appellation going 
forward.” Id.; see also Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 804 
F.3d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2015) (“A dismissal for lack of statutory 
standing is effectively the same as a dismissal for failure to 
state a claim, and a motion to dismiss on this ground is brought 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), rather than Rule 12(b)(1).” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 15-CV-1107(JGK), 2015 WL 9462083, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2015). In a class action, a court must 
analyze the injuries allegedly suffered by the named plaintiffs, 
not unnamed members of the potential class, to determine whether 
the plaintiffs have Article III standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 502 (1975). 
A legally protected interest may exist solely by virtue of 
“statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing.” Id. at 500. However, the injury-in-fact requirement 
“is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be 
removed by statute.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 
488, 497 (2009). 
“An allegation of future injury may suffice if the 
threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a 
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony 
List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting Clapper 
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013)). The 
Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robin, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), 
recently clarified that “[f]or an injury to be ‘particularized,’ 
it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way,’” id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.l), while 
for an injury to be “concrete,” it must be “real, and not 
abstract,” id. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
Court instructed that the determination of whether a violation 
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of a statute constitutes a concrete injury-in-fact is aided by 
reference to congressional intent and the common law. Id. 
However, Spokeo held that although “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to 
the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto 
injuries that were previously inadequate in law,’” id. at 1549 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578), a “bare procedural violation” 
under a federal statute, “divorced from any concrete harm,” that 
“may result in no harm,” would not “satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement.” Id.  
In the context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the 
“FCRA”) --- which requires consumer reporting agencies to 
“‘follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 
accuracy of’ consumer reports,” and “to notify providers and 
users of consumer information of their responsibilities under 
the [FCRA],” and gives an injured individual a private right of 
action for an agency’s willful failure to comply with the FCRA, 
see id. at 1545 (citations omitted) --- the Supreme Court in 
Spokeo observed that an agency that merely disseminated a 
deficient statutory notice, or inaccurate information that was 
not materially inaccurate, absent more, would have only 
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committed “bare procedural violations” of the FCRA that would 
not give rise to a concrete injury, see id. at 1550.6 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Strubel v. 
Comenity Bank, No. 15-528-CV, 2016 WL 6892197 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 
2016), interpreted “Spokeo, and the cases cited therein, to 
instruct that an alleged procedural violation can by itself 
manifest concrete injury where Congress conferred the procedural 
right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete interests and where the 
procedural violation presents a ‘risk of real harm’ to that 
concrete interest. But even where Congress has accorded 
procedural rights to protect a concrete interest, a plaintiff 
may fail to demonstrate concrete injury where violation of the 
procedure at issue presents no material risk of harm to that 
underlying interest.” Id. at *5 (citation omitted). In Strubel, 
a consumer claimed that a bank’s allegedly deficient disclosures 
violated the Truth in Lending Act (the “TILA”), and entitled the 
consumer to seek statutory damages under the TILA. See id. at 
*1-2. The Court of Appeals began its assessment of the 
consumer’s standing by analyzing the concrete interests 
protected by the TILA. See id. at *4 (“[T]o determine whether a 
procedural violation manifests injury in fact, a court properly 
considers whether Congress conferred the procedural right in 
                                                 
6 The Article III principles articulated in Spokeo also apply to 
laws enacted by the States. See Hecht v. Hertz Corp., No. 2:16-
CV-01485 (WJM), 2016 WL 6139911, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016). 
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order to protect an individual’s concrete interests.”). The 
court observed that the goals of the TILA’s disclosure 
requirements are to “protect consumers against inaccurate and 
unfair credit billing and credit card practices and promote the 
informed use of credit by assuring a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms.” Id. at *2 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). In other words, these were the concrete interests that 
the TILA’s mandatory disclosure requirements were designed to 
protect. See id. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the consumer had 
standing to pursue only some of her claims of TILA violations. 
The court found that the consumer had standing to pursue claims 
related to notice violations that could actually hinder the 
exercise of her prospective rights as a consumer, without any 
allegations of additional harm, because those violations could 
frustrate a “core object of the TILA” of “avoiding the 
uninformed use of credit.” Id. at *5 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). As the court observed, “A consumer who 
is not given notice of his obligations is likely not to satisfy 
them and, thereby, unwittingly to lose the very credit rights 
that the law affords him.” Id.  
By contrast, the Court of Appeals found that a claim based 
upon the failure to present clearly certain information in the 
notice about the bank’s prospective obligations to the consumer 
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--- but that could not plausibly obscure prospective rights that 
the consumer could exercise --- would be too abstract to support 
standing because no actual harm resulted, and, even if a risk of 
harm had materialized, the bank could have still complied with 
its obligations under the TILA despite the deficient notice 
about its obligations. See id. at *8 (“It would be more than 
curious to conclude that a consumer sustains real injury to 
concrete TILA interests simply from a creditor’s failure to 
advise of a reporting obligation that, in the end, the creditor 
honors.”). There was no real material risk that the goals of the 
TILA would be frustrated by these statutory violations. See id. 
at *7-8. While not dispositive, the Court of Appeals also noted 
that the consumer had not alleged that she (or, more generally, 
any consumer) would have changed her behavior to avoid any 
adverse consequences from the deficient notice, which further 
weighed against a finding of standing. Id. at *7. In addition, 
the Court of Appeals found that the bank’s failure to notify the 
consumer about a credit product that the bank did not offer 
could not support standing. Id. at *6. 
Also instructive is a recent decision of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 
McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 CV 03777, 2016 WL 
4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016), which denied standing to a 
plaintiff for alleged violations of the BIPA. In that case, the 
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defendant provided for rent a fingerprint-coded locker that used 
the plaintiff’s fingerprint as the “key” to lock and unlock the 
locker. See id. at *1. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
had violated multiple provisions of the BIPA. See id. 
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant collected 
and indefinitely retained fingerprint data without publishing 
any destruction guidelines. See id. at *1-2. The plaintiff also 
alleged that the defendant failed to give any notice, or receive 
any written consent acknowledging, that the defendant was 
collecting or using biometric identifiers. Id. at *1. The court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims of bare procedural and 
technical violations of the BIPA for want of Article III 
standing, reasoning that the plaintiff “undoubtedly understood 
when she first used the system that her fingerprint data would 
have to be retained until she retrieved her belongings from the 
locker.” Id. at *3. As the court held, “Even without prior 
written consent to retain, if [the defendant] did indeed retain 
the fingerprint data beyond the rental period, this Court finds 
it difficult to imagine, without more, how this retention could 
work a concrete harm.” Id. at *4 (citing Gubala v. Time Warner 
Cable, Inc., No. 15-CV-1078-PP, 2016 WL 3390415, at *4 (E.D. 
Wis. June 17, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-2613, 2017 WL 243343 (7th 
Cir. Jan. 20, 2017)); see also Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, 
Inc., No. 16-2613, 2017 WL 243343, at *1-4 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 
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2017) (dismissing for lack of Article III standing claims for 
alleged violations of the Cable Communications Policy Act (the 
“CCPA”), a data protection statute analogous to the BIPA); 
Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 
2016).7  
(i) 
The plaintiffs argue that the purported procedural 
violations of the BIPA, without any allegations of additional 
harm, are sufficient to confer standing. The plaintiffs’ 
allegations of procedural violations fall into two 
interconnected categories: violation of the provisions 
regulating the storage and dissemination of biometric 
information, see 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(a), (b), (c), (e), 
and violation of the provisions governing notice and consent, 
see 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(a), (b), (d). 
Under Strubel, to assess the plaintiffs’ standing to pursue 
their claims, the first task is to identify any “concrete 
interests” protected by the BIPA. The plaintiffs contend that an 
individual’s right to privacy in the individual’s biometrics is 
                                                 
7 As explained below, the court in McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, 
at *4, also held that the plaintiff did not have a cause of 
action under the BIPA because the plaintiff was a not a “person 
aggrieved by a violation” of the statute within the meaning of 
the BIPA. The conclusion that the alleged procedural violations 
here cannot support Article III standing is bolstered by the 
conclusion that the plaintiffs do not have a cause of action 
under the BIPA. 
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the concrete interest protected by the BIPA. Cf. In re Facebook 
Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., No. 15-CV-03747-JD, 2016 WL 
2593853, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2016) (reasoning that, for 
conflict of laws purposes, the “BIPA manifests Illinois’ 
substantial policy of protecting its citizens’ right to privacy 
in their personal biometric data”).8 Put more finely, “[t]he core 
object,” Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *5, of the BIPA is data 
protection to curb potential misuse of biometric information 
collected by private entities. The provisions of the BIPA 
plainly seek to ensure that, when an individual engages in a 
biometric-facilitated transaction, the private entity protects 
the individual’s biometric data, and does not use that data in a 
way not contemplated by the underlying transaction. The BIPA 
expressly contemplates the use of biometric information for the 
transactions contemplated by the parties. See also 740 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 14/10(d)(2) (permitting “disclosure or redisclosure” 
of biometrics that “completes the financial transaction”). 
None of the plaintiffs’ allegations of procedural 
violations, on their own, demonstrate a material risk of harm to 
the BIPA’s concrete data protection interest because there is no 
plausible allegation that there is a material risk that the 
plaintiffs’ biometrics may be used in a way not contemplated by 
                                                 
8 In re Facebook, 2016 WL 2593853, at *11, did not consider any 
standing issues, and thus is of limited relevance to the 
standing question here. 
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the underlying use of the MyPlayer feature. The plaintiffs 
allege that they agreed to the MyPlayer terms and conditions, 
that NBA 2K15 scanned their faces to create personalized 
basketball avatars, and that the plaintiffs used their 
personalized basketball avatars for in-game play. The plaintiffs 
thus allege that the MyPlayer feature functioned exactly as 
anticipated. There is no allegation that Take-Two has 
disseminated or sold the plaintiffs’ biometric data to third-
parties, or that Take-Two has used the plaintiffs’ biometric 
information in any way not contemplated by the only possible use 
of the MyPlayer feature: the creation of personalized basketball 
avatars for in-game play. See Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 
No. 15-cv-3934, 2016 WL 3369541, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2016) 
(holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue claims for 
alleged violations of the Michigan Video Rental Privacy Act 
where the defendant-company, without permission, sold personal 
data to third-parties, including data mining companies). The 
purported violations of the BIPA are, at best, marginal, and the 
plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims for the alleged 
bare procedural violations of the BIPA.  
(a) 
With respect to the purported violations of the BIPA’s 
storage and dissemination provisions, the plaintiffs fail to 
establish that there is an imminent risk of harm that Take-Two’s 
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storage and dissemination of their facial scans could compromise 
the data protection interest of the BIPA. The plaintiffs 
primarily predicate their standing argument on Take-Two’s 
alleged failure to store and transmit their facial scans with a 
reasonable degree of industry-standard care, and in a manner 
used for other types of confidential and sensitive information, 
in violation of Section 15(e) of the BIPA.  
In Strubel, the Court of Appeals cited the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Braitberg, 836 F.3d 
at 929–30, which held “that [the] unlawful retention of personal 
information did not manifest concrete injury absent alleged 
disclosure or misuse,” Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *8 n.15, and 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4728027, at *3 (6th 
Cir. Sept. 12, 2016) (summary order), which held that the 
“failure to adopt statutorily mandated procedures to protect 
against wrongful dissemination of data manifested concrete 
injury where plaintiffs alleged data was stolen.” Strubel, 2016 
WL 6892197, at *8 n.15. This case is plainly more analogous to 
Braitberg than Galaria. The plaintiffs’ allegations do not 
establish an imminent risk that their biometrics could actually 
be misused, and there has been no event, such as the data theft 
in Galaria, that could make any such risk rise above the 
abstract level. See also Gubala, 2017 WL 243343, at *1 (“[The 
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plaintiff] has presented neither allegation nor evidence of 
having been ‘aggrieved’ by [the defendant’s] violation of [the 
CCPA]—no allegation or evidence that in the decade since he 
subscribed to [the defendant’s] residential services any of the 
personal information that he supplied to the company when he 
subscribed had leaked and caused financial or other injury to 
him or had even been at risk of being leaked.”). 
At best, the plaintiffs’ allegations are that Take-Two’s 
storage and dissemination practices have subjected their facial 
scans to an “enhanced risk of harm” of somehow falling into the 
“wrong hands,” which is too abstract and speculative to support 
standing. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4; see also, 
e.g., Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Gonzales, 468 F. Supp. 2d 429, 
444 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[S]peculation that . . . some unauthorized 
party may access plaintiffs’ [information stored in a database] 
in violation of a plaintiff members’ privacy right does not 
satisfy the requirement that plaintiffs identify an ‘actual or 
imminent,’ ‘concrete and particularized’ injury.”); Gubala, 2017 
WL 243343, at *1-2, *4; Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930; Chambliss v. 
Carefirst, Inc, No. CV RDB-15-2288, 2016 WL 3055299, at *2 (D. 
Md. May 27, 2016) (dismissing claims for failure to protect 
personal data in compliance with the Maryland Personal 
Information Protection Act for want of standing); see also 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 (expressing “our usual reluctance to 
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endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the 
decisions of independent actors”). Indeed, the plaintiffs do not 
allege that their face scans have been obtained by a third-
party, subjected to identity theft, or misused in any way.  
The plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the speculative and 
abstract nature of their claims by arguing that the potential 
risk of harm associated with the face scans could be potentially 
great because faces are relatively immutable, and, unlike (for 
example) passwords, cannot be changed. But the hypothetical 
magnitude of a highly speculative and abstract injury that is 
not certainly impending does not make the injury any less 
speculative and abstract. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147-1148; 
Summers, 555 U.S. at 497 (“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement is a 
hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by 
statute.”).  
The plaintiffs also argue that Take-Two violated Section 
15(c) of the BIPA by somehow “profiting” from the plaintiffs’ 
facial scans when the plaintiffs played NBA 2K15 with their 
personalized basketball avatars in multiplayer mode. The 
plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that Take-Two advertises the 
MyPlayer feature, which encourages individuals to purchase NBA 
2K15 games.9 The allegations are insufficient for standing 
                                                 
9 The plaintiffs’ claim here appears to be based on a misreading 
of the BIPA. Section 15(c) of the BIPA provides that, “No 
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because they do not establish that the plaintiffs suffered any 
actual or imminent harm as a result of Take-Two’s advertising 
practices. The plaintiffs allege that Take-Two has advertised 
the MyPlayer feature; they do not allege that Take-Two has used 
their facial scans to promote or advertise NBA 2K15, or that 
Take-Two has otherwise profited from their facial scans by, for 
example, selling the scans to third-parties.  
(b) 
With respect to the purported violations of the notice and 
consent provisions, the plaintiffs claim that the notice and 
consent that they received was insufficient because the MyPlayer 
feature terms and conditions did not specifically disclose that 
                                                                                                                                                             
private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or 
biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise 
profit from a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or 
biometric information.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(c) (emphasis 
added). The plaintiffs appear to interpret “profiting” to mean 
that a private entity violates the BIPA by selling a game that 
includes a biometric-related feature. That interpretation is 
plainly at odds with the BIPA, which is designed to regulate and 
promote, but not inhibit, biometric-facilitated transactions. 
Instead, Section 15(c) is clearly geared toward prohibiting the 
unauthorized dissemination of biometric information that a 
private entity is already “in possession of” due to an 
underlying biometric-facilitated transaction, but where the 
dissemination is not otherwise contemplated by the underlying 
biometric-facilitated transaction. In relation to the other 
terms in Section 15(c) --- “selling,” “leasing,” and “trading”  
--- “otherwise profiting” is a catchall for prohibiting 
commercially transferring biometric information and biometric 
identifiers in a manner not contemplated by the original 
biometric-facilitated transaction, without consent from the 
individual pursuant to Section 15(d). Promoting a transaction   
--- here, the sale of a video game --- by advertising a 
biometric-related feature does not contravene the statute. 
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their faces constituted biometrics, the purpose of the scanning, 
or the length of the face scan retention period; because the 
plaintiffs’ consent to use the MyPlayer feature was not embodied 
in a writing; and because Take-Two did not publish a biometric 
retention schedule. These violations can only support standing 
if they pose a material risk of harm to the data protection goal 
of the BIPA. At best, more extensive notice and consent could 
have dissuaded the plaintiffs from using the MyPlayer feature, 
meaning that Take-Two would have never collected the plaintiffs’ 
biometrics. But the plaintiffs have failed to establish that 
their use of the MyPlayer feature resulted in any imminent risk 
that the data protection goal of the BIPA would be frustrated. 
Consequently, more extensive notice and consent could not have 
altered the standing equation because there has been no material 
risk of harm to a concrete BIPA interest that more extensive 
notice and consent would have avoided. 
The plaintiffs argue that the alleged notice and consent 
violations harmed their “right-to-information” about the 
underlying biometric transaction, which the plaintiffs contend 
should be sufficient in-of-itself to confer standing without any 
allegations of additional harm. The purported right-to-
information about a biometric-facilitated transaction is not a 
concrete interest separate from the core object of the BIPA to 
prevent biometric data misuse. The alleged failure to give the 
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plaintiffs more extensive notice and consent is not a material 
risk to a concrete BIPA interest where no material risk of 
biometric data misuse ever materialized. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1549; McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *3-4. 
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the BIPA is not akin 
to a statute where the right-to-information is a concrete 
interest in-of-itself, such as a statute designed to give a 
consumer information about prospective statutory rights that the 
consumer could exercise, but that might otherwise be lost, see 
Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *5-6 (discussing the TILA); a 
statute designed to provide information about government 
activities, see FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (the 
Federal Election Campaign Act); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989) (the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act); or a statute designed to remedy housing 
discrimination by ensuring that all individuals, including 
protected classes, receive truthful information about housing 
availabilities, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 
363, 374 (1982) (the Fair Housing Act).  
Unlike statutes where the provision of information about 
statutory rights, or matters of public concern, is an end 
itself, the BIPA’s notice and consent provisions do not create a 
separate interest in the right-to-information, but instead 
operate in support of the data protection goal of the statute. 
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Section 15(a) requires that private entities publish retention 
and destruction schedules for biometric data. However, a private 
entity may destroy biometrics pursuant to the requirements set 
forth in Section 15(a), and thus effectively comply with the 
core data protection goal of the BIPA while also technically 
violating the BIPA by failing to publish a retention schedule. 
See Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *8 (“It would be more than 
curious to conclude that a consumer sustains real injury to 
concrete TILA interests simply from a creditor’s failure to 
advise of a reporting obligation that, in the end, the creditor 
honors.”).  
The BIPA’s mandated disclosures are minimal. Section 15(b) 
of the BIPA simply provides that a notice must “inform[] the 
subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or 
biometric information is being collected or stored,” that the 
notice must include the length and purpose of that collection, 
and that consent must be in writing. The BIPA’s disclosure and 
consent requirements are plainly designed to allow parties to 
set the contours for the permissible uses of the biometrics 
collected in the underlying biometric-facilitated transaction to 
ensure that the data collected is used only for the fulfillment 
of the transaction in question. Once biometric data is collected 
by a private entity, there is no further prospective BIPA right 
that the individual can exercise --- and thus that the 
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individual could be advised about at the outset --- other than 
to expand the scope of the underlying transaction pursuant to 
Section 15(d). See Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *8 (finding that 
disclosures that did not hinder the exercise of prospective 
rights that the consumer could exercise weighed against a 
finding of standing). Even without fully compliant notice and 
consent, no concrete BIPA interest can be harmed so long as the 
private entity only uses the biometrics collected as both 
parties intended. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *3. 
In arguing that bare violations of the notice and consent 
provisions alone can support standing, the plaintiffs are 
essentially attempting to bootstrap two sets of bare procedural 
violations --- the alleged procedurally deficient notice and 
consent that failed to warn the plaintiffs about the later 
procedural violations of the BIPA with respect to storage and 
dissemination --- without establishing a material risk to a 
concrete interest protected by the BIPA. But “in the absence of 
a connection between a procedural violation and a concrete 
interest, a bare violation of the former does not manifest 
injury in fact.” Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *4. The only 
concrete interest protected by the BIPA is biometric data 
protection. Because the plaintiffs have failed to establish a 
material risk to that interest, the plaintiffs’ claims of 
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violations of the notice and consent provisions of the BIPA must 
be dismissed for want of standing. 
Moreover, the difference between the actual notice and 
consent in this case, and that purportedly required by the BIPA, 
does not rise to more than a procedural violation, which is 
plainly insufficient for standing under Spokeo and Strubel. 
There is no plausible allegation that, based on the notice the 
plaintiffs received, the plaintiffs did not understand that 
their faces would be scanned, and that those face scans would be 
used to create personalized basketball avatars. The plaintiffs 
allege that they received advance notice that their faces would 
be scanned, that they consented to have their faces scanned when 
they agreed to the MyPlayer terms and conditions, and that Take-
Two used the face scans to create personalized basketball 
avatars. Ricardo Vigil allegedly bought NBA 2K15 so that the 
plaintiffs could use the MyPlayer feature for its only alleged 
purpose, the creation of personalized basketball avatars. The 
plaintiffs further allege that they appreciated that the 
digitized renditions of their faces would appear onscreen in 
multiplayer mode over the Internet. The allegations establish 
that the plaintiffs understood the purpose of using the MyPlayer 
feature, and there is no allegation that Take-Two has strayed 
from that purpose.  
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Although the MyPlayer terms and conditions explicitly 
referenced “face scans,” SAC ¶ 28, the plaintiffs claim that 
they did not understand that their “face scans” were unique 
“biometric identifiers” as defined by the BIPA. To the extent 
that informing a “subject” in a notice about a “face scan” (a 
type of biometric identifier), as opposed to using the specific 
words “biometric identifier” (a statutory term of art), is in 
fact a violation of the BIPA, the alleged violation is merely a 
procedural violation, and poses no real risk of harm to a BIPA 
interest. The allegations show that the plaintiffs, at the very 
least, understood that Take-Two had to collect data based upon 
their faces in order to create the personalized basketball 
avatars, and that a derivative of the data would be stored in 
the resulting digital faces of those avatars so long as those 
avatars existed. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *1 n.1, *3 
(finding that it would be inconceivable that a plaintiff would 
not understand that a locker that used a fingerprint to lock-
and-unlock the locker would not collect and store fingerprint 
data).  
The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ right-to-information theory 
is thus necessarily that, even though the plaintiffs understood 
the purpose of the face scans, the plaintiffs did not adequately 
understand that Take-Two had a duty under the BIPA to destroy 
their biometric data within a prescribed time period. Although 
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Take-Two failed to disclose the length of the retention, the 
allegedly indefinite retention does not on its own pose an 
imminent risk of harm to any concrete BIPA interest. See Gubala, 
2017 WL 243343, at *1-2; Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 929–30; 
McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *3-4. Moreover, Take-Two may 
ultimately destroy the biometric data in compliance with Section 
15(a) of the BIPA. Thus, the technical violations of the BIPA 
may result in no harm to the plaintiffs despite the notice 
deficiency, which cannot support standing. See Strubel, 2016 WL 
6892197, at *8 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550). 
In addition, the plaintiffs do not claim that they would 
have foregone use of the MyPlayer feature if they had received 
more extensive notice and consent. The Second Amended Complaint 
only alleges that, had Ricardo Vigil known that Take-Two was not 
complying with the BIPA, he would not have purchased NBA 2K15. 
But even that allegation of buyer’s remorse is not plausible 
given the allegation that both plaintiffs used the MyPlayer 
feature, and that any failure to comply with the BIPA presented 
no risk of an imminent or concrete injury to either of the 
plaintiffs. See Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *7-8. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims for procedural 
violations of the notice and consent provisions of the BIPA are 
not in-of-themselves sufficient to confer standing.  
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(ii) 
The plaintiffs advance several theories of additional harm 
in an effort to manufacture an injury-in-fact, but these 
theories are divorced from any alleged violations of the BIPA. 
None of the theories is sufficient for standing purposes.  
First, the plaintiffs claim that, as a result of their 
experiences with NBA 2K15, they have become reluctant to enter 
into future biometric-facilitated transactions. The plaintiffs 
have suffered no injury-in-fact as a result of Take-Two’s 
alleged violations of the BIPA, and “cannot manufacture standing 
merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of 
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151; see also Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 
F.3d 64, 79 (1st Cir. 2012) (“When an individual alleges that 
her injury is having to take or forebear from some action, that 
choice must be premised on a reasonably impending threat.”). The 
plaintiffs’ alleged apprehension that a hypothetical private 
entity may, in an unrelated biometric-facilitated transaction, 
violate the BIPA, is too speculative and abstract to support 
standing. 
Second, the plaintiffs argue that Take-Two has 
misappropriated their facial scans to their detriment, and 
thereby invaded their privacy. They further contend that the 
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BIPA represents an extension of Illinois common law privacy 
protections to biometrics.  
Under Illinois law, to state an “appropriation claim,” a 
plaintiff must allege “an appropriation, without consent, of 
one’s name or likeness for another’s use or benefit. . . . This 
branch of the privacy doctrine is designed to protect a person 
from having his name or image used for commercial purposes 
without consent.” Dwyer v. Am. Exp. Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 
(Ill. App. 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
plaintiffs’ creative theory of misappropriation is incompatible 
with the claims in the Second Amended Complaint because the 
plaintiffs allege that they agreed to have their faces scanned, 
and displayed on personalized basketball avatars.  
Moreover, while the plaintiffs argue that the plaintiffs’ 
facial scans must have value to Take-Two, any value to Take-Two 
is irrelevant so long as Take-Two takes no action that 
diminishes the value of the plaintiffs’ likenesses. See id. 
(“Undeniably, each cardholder’s name is valuable to defendants. 
. . . [But] defendants’ practices do not deprive any of the 
cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”). 
There is no allegation that Take-Two has taken any action that 
would diminish the value of the plaintiffs’ likenesses, and thus 
no allegations that could support an injury-in-fact for 
misappropriation. See, e.g., Gubala, 2017 WL 243343, at *3 
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(noting that “[v]iolations of rights of privacy are actionable, 
but . . . there is no indication of any violation of the 
plaintiff’s privacy because there is no indication that [the 
defendant] has released, or allowed anyone to disseminate, any 
of the plaintiff’s personal information in the [the defendant’s] 
possession” and characterizing the claim that the mere unlawful 
retention of personal information diminished the value of that 
information as “gibberish”); Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930 
(“Although there is a common law tradition of lawsuits for 
invasion of privacy, the retention of information lawfully 
obtained, without further disclosure, traditionally has not 
provided the basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”). The 
plaintiffs’ theory of misappropriation is inapplicable to this 
case.  
Third, in their most recent submission, the plaintiffs 
contend that the real gravamen of their complaint is that, 
although they consented to have their faces scanned, they did 
not explicitly consent to have their biometric identifiers 
scanned and retained. The plaintiffs claim that this is a 
violation of their right to “biometric privacy.” The plaintiffs 
argue that, because they gave consent in response to a 
procedurally deficient notice, their consent was ineffective. 
The plaintiffs’ theory of a violation of a right to 
biometric privacy is simply the latest variant on two already 
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rejected theories of harm: misappropriation and injury to a 
purported BIPA “right-to-information” interest. There is no 
basis for this claimed injury. See Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 
No. 2:15-0190 (WJM), 2016 WL 6133827, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 
2016) (noting that while a statute “as a whole may implicate 
traditional privacy interests, Plaintiff’s alleged injury” that 
the defendants were disclosing information in violation of the 
statute was insufficient to establish standing).  
Again, Illinois common law is instructive. Illinois has 
adopted the Second Restatement of Tort’s definition of intrusion 
on seclusion, meaning, “One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 
Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of Ill., 983 N.E.2d 414, 424 (Ill. 2012) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977)). “The core 
of this tort is the offensive prying into the private domain of 
another. . . . The examples provided [by Prosser and Keeton’s 
treatise on torts] as forming the basis for the tort of 
intrusion into the seclusion of another include the following 
acts: invading someone’s home; an illegal search of someone’s 
shopping bag in a store; eavesdropping by wiretapping; peering 
into the windows of a private home; and persistent and unwanted 
Case 1:15-cv-08211-JGK   Document 74   Filed 01/30/17   Page 39 of 51
40 
 
telephone calls.” Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat. Bank of 
Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill. 1989) (citation omitted). 
Intrusion on seclusion is therefore analogous to tortious or 
criminal trespass. See id.; Benitez v. KFC Nat. Mgmt. Co., 714 
N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ill. App. 1999). The sine qua non of an 
intrusion is that it is unauthorized. See Schmidt v. Ameritech 
Ill., 768 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Ill. App. 2002). Nevertheless, at 
common law, not every unlawful or unauthorized collection of 
information, or collection of information for an improper 
purpose, gave rise to an intrusion on seclusion. See, e.g., 
Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1351, 1354 (affirming dismissal of 
intrusion on seclusion claim against a credit-card company that 
compiled and sold customer data to third-parties because the 
customers had voluntarily given such information to the company, 
even though the company gave no notice to its customers 
regarding the complained-of activities, which allegedly violated 
consumer protection laws). 
The plaintiffs argue that the BIPA created a substantive 
right to privacy in biometric identifiers, but there is nothing 
in the statute to support the assertion. The BIPA created 
procedural safeguards so that consumers could enter into 
transactions using biometric identifiers without having those 
identifiers misused. The plaintiffs do not allege that their 
biometric identifiers have been used for anything other than for 
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in-game play in NBA 2K15, a use for which the plaintiffs 
expressly consented. The plaintiffs’ allegations are thus not 
akin to a violation of the common law tort of intrusion on 
seclusion, which involves an unauthorized intrusion. 
Regardless of whether the plaintiffs understood the ins-
and-outs of the face scanning technology, or knew that their 
faces were “biometric identifiers” under the BIPA, the 
plaintiffs plainly understood that the MyPlayer feature had to 
collect data based upon their unique faces to create the 
personalized basketball avatars. See McCollough, 2016 WL 
4077108, at *3. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, a merely 
procedurally deficient notice does not automatically invalidate 
any resulting consent, and thus give rise to an Article III 
injury based on an invasion of privacy. See id.; Nokchan v. 
Lyft, Inc., No. 15-CV-03008-JCS, 2016 WL 5815287, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 5, 2016) (rejecting the claim “that the authorization 
[the plaintiff] gave [the defendant] to obtain his personal 
information was not proper” under the FCRA could support an 
injury for invasion of privacy); see also Gubala, 2017 WL 
243343, at *3 (“[The defendant] did not take the plaintiff’s 
personal information away from him; he still has it . . .; he 
hasn’t been deprived of anything; and he isn’t asking [the 
defendant] to return his personal information in its files to 
him; he is asking it to comply with the [CCPA] by destroying the 
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information, an act that if committed is unlikely to have the 
least effect on him.”); Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930.  
This case is nothing like the cases upon which the 
plaintiffs rely, such as Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-
LHK, 2016 WL 5339806 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016). In that case, 
the court found that the plaintiffs had standing where the 
defendant had allegedly “intercept[ed], scan[ed], and analyz[ed] 
. . . email[s] . . . without the plaintiffs’ knowledge or 
consent” in violation of wire-tap and other privacy statutes. 
Id. at *1, *10-14. The plaintiffs’ artful resort to a theory of 
intrusion on seclusion, or privacy, cannot save their claims.10  
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that Ricardo Vigil suffered a 
tangible economic harm because he purchased NBA 2K15, in part, 
due to the presence of the MyPlayer feature, and has since 
wanted to return the game for a refund in light of Take-Two’s 
alleged failure to comply with the BIPA. The implication is 
that, had Ricardo Vigil known that Take-Two would allegedly 
violate the BIPA, he would never have purchased the game. The 
plaintiffs’ argument rests on a diminished “benefit-of-the-
bargain” theory of liability --- that Take-Two’s alleged 
                                                 
10 The parties dispute whether the plaintiffs had a privacy 
interest in their faces that could be invaded in the first 
place, but it is unnecessary to reach the issue because the 
plaintiffs’ allegations cannot be construed to have established 
a claim based on any theory of invasion of privacy. 
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procedural violations diminished the value of the transaction 
for Ricardo Vigil.  
The plaintiffs’ argument is an odd fit with their claims 
that Take-Two violated the statutory provisions of the BIPA, and 
essentially crams a breach of contract, or unjust enrichment, 
theory of liability into a complaint that includes no breach of 
contract or unjust enrichment claims. See Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst 
Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he 
plaintiffs apparently believe that if they keep oscillating 
between tort and contract law claims, they can obscure the fact 
that they have asserted no concrete injury” and rejecting as 
“artful pleading” the plaintiffs’ “attempt to recast their 
product liability claim in the language of contract law”).  
The plaintiffs’ theory of harm is attenuated from any 
alleged procedural violations of the BIPA, which have caused 
Ricardo Vigil no concrete harm in the first place. In data 
storage and collection cases, courts have consistently rejected 
as too tenuous to support an injury-in-fact claims that a 
defendant’s failure to comply with the law, or to prevent an 
actual data breach, diminished the “benefit-of-the-bargain.” 
See, e.g., Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 931 (“Nor are we convinced 
that [the plaintiff] has alleged an economic injury arising from 
an alleged diminution of the value of the cable services that he 
purchased from [the defendant]. . . . [W]ithout a plausible 
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allegation that [the defendant’s] mere retention of the 
information caused any concrete and particularized harm to the 
value of that information, [the plaintiff] has not adequately 
alleged that there was any effect on the value of the services 
that he purchased from [the defendant].”); Chambliss, 2016 WL 
3055299, at *5-6; In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 
962 n.5 (D. Nev. 2015); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. 
(SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 30 
(D.D.C. 2014); Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 
2016 WL 3683001, at *6 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016). Ricardo Vigil 
received the benefit of the bargain with Take-Two, a copy of NBA 
2K15 with a MyPlayer feature. The Second Amended Complaint fails 
to allege any way in which Take-Two’s alleged procedural 
violations of the BIPA --- which otherwise caused Ricardo Vigil 
no Article III injury --- diminished the value of that bargain.  
Furthermore, compliance with the laws is ordinarily not 
presumed to be part of a contractual bargain absent an express 
or implied agreement. See, e.g., Banco del Austro, S.A. v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-CV-00628 (LAK), 2016 WL 6084082, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016); Stewart v. Gino’s E. Rest. Corp., No. 
07C6340, 2008 WL 4865882, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2008). The 
Second Amended Complaint has not alleged that Take-Two promised 
Ricardo Vigil that it would comply with the BIPA when he 
purchased NBA 2K15, let alone that Ricardo Vigil purchased NBA 
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2K15 with that expectation. As such, the Second Amended 
Complaint has not plausibly alleged that compliance with the 
BIPA was part of the bargain between Take-Two and Ricardo Vigil, 
meaning that any noncompliance with the BIPA by Take-Two could 
not have plausibly diminished the value of the bargain for 
Ricardo Vigil. 
The plaintiffs cannot aggregate multiple bare procedural 
violations to create standing where no injury-in-fact otherwise 
exists. Accordingly, the plaintiffs do not have Article III 
standing to pursue their claims against Take-Two. 
B. 
Independent of Article III standing, Take-Two argues that 
the plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under the BIPA. The 
BIPA grants a private right of action to “any person aggrieved 
by a violation” of the BIPA. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/20. Take-
Two interprets “aggrieved” as limiting the private of action to 
parties that have been injured by a statutory violation. Take-
Two therefore contends that, for the reasons discussed above, 
the plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury that could 
support a cause of action under the BIPA. 
As with the Article III standing inquiry, the McCollough 
decision is instructive, and supports Take-Two’s interpretation 
of the BIPA. The court in McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4, 
concluded that the term “aggrieved” in the BIPA requires a 
Case 1:15-cv-08211-JGK   Document 74   Filed 01/30/17   Page 45 of 51
46 
 
plaintiff to establish an injury due to a statutory violation, 
and held that the plaintiff there, in addition to lacking 
Article III standing, also did not have a cause of action under 
the BIPA. To arrive at that conclusion, the court analyzed the 
use of “aggrieved” within the broader Illinois statutory 
landscape: 
The [BIPA] does not define “aggrieved.” Other Illinois 
statutes, however, do define “aggrieved party.” Under 
the Illinois Human Rights Act, for example, it means 
“a person who is alleged or proved to have been 
injured by a civil rights violation or believes he or 
she will be injured by a civil rights violation . . . 
.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103(B). Under the Soil and Water 
Conservation District Acts an aggrieved party “means 
any person whose property resources, interest or 
responsibility is being injured or impeded in value or 
utility or any other manner by the adverse effects of 
sediment caused by soil erosion . . . .” 70 ILCS 
405/3.20. These definitions each invoke the concept of 
injury resulting from a statutory violation. Thus, it 
appears that by limiting the right to sue to persons 
aggrieved by a violation of the act, the Illinois 
legislature intended to include only persons having 
suffered an injury from a violation as “aggrieved.” 
 
Id. The court also noted that the interpretation of 
“aggrieved” as meaning that a plaintiff must establish “an 
injury” was consistent with Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition 
of an “aggrieved party,” which is “[a] party entitled to a 
remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property 
rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions 
or by a court’s decree or judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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The court’s analysis in McCollough is persuasive. 
Significantly, other Illinois statutes do not contain similar 
limiting language. For example, the “Customer Service and 
Privacy Protection” of Illinois’ Cable and Video Customer 
Protection Law provides that “[a]ny customer . . . may pursue 
alleged violations of this Act by the cable or video provider in 
a court of competent jurisdiction.” 220 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/22-
501 (emphasis added). The difference strongly suggests that the 
inclusion of “aggrieved” in an Illinois statute limits a private 
right of action to a party that can link an injury to a 
statutory violation.  
The plaintiffs oppose this interpretation and argue at 
length that “aggrieved” means only that a plaintiff must come 
within a statute’s zone-of-interest, but the cases that the 
plaintiffs cite lead to the inference that, under Illinois law, 
“aggrieved” means that a plaintiff must link a statutory harm to 
an injury to have a cause of action.11 See, e.g., Am. Sur. Co. v. 
Jones, 51 N.E.2d 122, 125-26 (Ill. 1943) (under Illinois law, a 
statute that gives an “aggrieved” party a right to seek judicial 
review of an administrative decision means that the party must 
have “a direct, immediate and substantial interest rather than a 
                                                 
11 Because “aggrieved” requires a plaintiff to establish that the 
plaintiff suffered harm attributable to a statutory violation, 
and because the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this 
threshold, the plaintiffs cannot be said to fall within the 
BIPA’s zone-of-interest.  
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speculative, theoretical, inconsequential or remote interest” in 
the matter); Glos v. People, 102 N.E. 763, 766 (Ill. 1913) (“A 
person is prejudiced or aggrieved, in the legal sense, when a 
legal right is invaded by the act complained of or his pecuniary 
interest is directly affected by the decree or judgment. . . . 
‘Aggrieved’ means having a substantial grievance; a denial of 
some personal or property right.”).  
The plaintiffs cite Mandziara v. Canulli, 701 N.E.2d 127 
(Ill. App. 1998), which involved alleged violations of the 
Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities 
Confidentiality Act (the “MHA”). The MHA provides that, “No 
party . . . nor his or her attorney, shall serve a subpoena 
seeking to obtain access to records or communications under this 
Act unless the subpoena is accompanied by a written order issued 
by a judge, authorizing the disclosure of the records or the 
issuance of the subpoena.” Id. at 131 (quoting 740 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 110/10(d)). The MHA also provides that, “Any person 
aggrieved by a violation of this Act may sue for damages, an 
injunction, or other appropriate relief.” Id. (quoting 740 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 110/15)). The court in Mandziara held that the 
plaintiff there “ha[d] the right to sue a lawyer who obtained 
and served a subpoena for [the plaintiff’s] records, which were 
then brought to a courtroom and used by a judge” in violation of 
the MHA. Id. at 129. In that case, the defendant-lawyer claimed 
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that he had not reviewed the mental health records himself, and 
thus that no harm to the plaintiff had occurred. See id. at 132. 
The court found that the defendant-lawyer’s claim was 
contradicted by the evidence, see id., but, regardless, observed 
that, “The [Illinois] General Assembly has made a strong 
statement about the importance of keeping mental health records 
confidential. If we were to hold [the defendant-lawyer] did not 
violate the [MHA] merely because he did not look at [the 
plaintiff’s] records, we would be rewriting the statute, 
effectively eroding unmistakable legislative intent under the 
weight of judicial fiat.” Id. at 133.  
The plaintiffs in this case seize on that language to argue 
that “aggrieved” does not require a plaintiff to establish an 
injury under Illinois law. The plaintiffs ignore that the court 
in Mandziara found that the plaintiff there had suffered an 
injury regardless of whether the defendant-lawyer had viewed the 
mental health records because the trial court had reviewed the 
mental health records in open court, and on the record, thus 
“improperly disclos[ing]” the plaintiff’s confidential 
information in violation of the MHA. See id. Mandziara’s 
interpretation of the MHA is consistent with the interpretation 
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of the BIPA that an “aggrieved” party must link a statutory 
violation to an injury to have a cause of action.12  
For the reasons already discussed, the plaintiffs have not 
established an injury attributable to an alleged procedural 
violation of the BIPA. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims must 
be dismissed. 
V. 
The plaintiffs have not asked for leave to amend the Second 
Amended Complaint. In any event, further amendment would be 
futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); 
Mackensworth v. S.S. Am. Merch., 28 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 
1994); see also Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 156 
F. Supp. 3d 491, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Generally, the grant of 
leave to amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within 
the discretion of the trial court.” (citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). The plaintiffs have already amended their 
complaint twice, and there is no suggestion that further 
amendment would enable them to cure the deficiencies in the 
Second Amended Complaint. See Leyse v. Bank of Am., Nat. Ass’n, 
                                                 
12 The plaintiffs cite Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 16 CH 
13 (Lake County Ill., June 17, 2016) (attached as Exhibit B to 
the plaintiffs’ opposition), which held that the plaintiff there 
had a cause of action under the BIPA to pursue claims of 
procedural violations regardless of whether those violations 
caused an injury. The court in Rosenbach denied the defendant-
amusement park’s motion to dismiss in a single sentence, devoid 
of any further reasoning. Id. Rosenbach is not persuasive. See 
McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *5 (discounting Rosenbach).  
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No. 09 CIV. 7654 (JGK), 2010 WL 2382400, at *6 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 14, 2010) (citing L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 
09 CIV. 1432 (DC), 2010 WL 532160, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 
2010)). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the 
parties. To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments 
are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, 
Take-Two’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is 
granted and the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice.13 The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing 
this action and closing the case. The Clerk is also directed to 
close all pending motions.  
SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: New York, New York 
  January 27, 2017   ____________/s/______________ 
           John G. Koeltl 
        United States District Judge 
                                                 
13 The dismissal is with prejudice because the dismissal is 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for failure to state a claim as well as pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for want 
of standing, and there is no basis to grant the plaintiffs leave 
to replead. See, e.g., Feinberg v. Apple, Inc., No. 15-CV-5198 
(RA), 2016 WL 4371746, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2016). 
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